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Abstract. 
In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard’s 
Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard’s own response to 
the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a 
satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins 
Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of 
Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic 
interpretation. I argue that none of these three interpretations comes without problems. I 
conclude that, until we have a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the 
Access Problem remains a challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. 
 
0. Introduction1 
According to Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism: 
 
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, an agent, S, has perceptual 
knowledge that P in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R [i.e., S’s 
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seeing that], for her belief that P which is both factive (i.e., R’s obtaining entails P) 
and reflectively accessible (Pritchard 2012: 13). 
 
In a context in which epistemology has been centred on the opposition between 
internalism and externalism, Epistemological Disjunctivism (henceforth, (ED)) seems to 
offer (if true) a middle way which would not force us to choose one side over the other. 
By requiring one’s rational support to be both reflectively accessible and factive2, ED 
combines the insights underpinning both epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism 
respectively. On one hand, the accessibility requirement enables Pritchard to account for 
the (internalist)3 intuition that the notion of justification should be considered in relation 
to the notion of epistemic responsibility (Pritchard, 2012: 2). On the other hand, the 
factivity requirement accommodates the (externalist) intuition that there must be a 
connection between the truth of the proposition and the reason why one believes such a 
proposition. A further motivation that makes Pritchard’s disjunctivism a very appealing 
view is that it combines internalism and externalism in such a way that it (allegedly) offers 
a neo-Moorean-style solution to the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox, while 
leaving our common pre-theoretical intuitions untouched (Pritchard, 2012, 2016). If true, 
ED would thus represent, according to Pritchard, the holy grail of epistemology. However, 
in his book, Pritchard anticipates what he takes to be three prima facie problems for his 
view: the Access Problem, the Basis Problem, and The Distinguishability Problem. While 
                                                        
2 Note that Pritchard’s use of ‘factive’ here differs from what epistemologists often have in mind 
when talking about ‘factive’ evidence/justification. While epistemologists traditionally refers to the 
idea that evidence/justification is constituted by true propositions, Pritchard merely refers to the 
truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support. 
3 For a variety of internalism about justification that rejects the accessibility requirement, namely, 
mentalism, see Conee and Feldman (2004). However, I will not be concerned with mentalism here. 
Rather, following Pritchard, I will consider internalism as traditionally understood, namely, as 
accessibilism. 
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many of the critics have focused on the last two problems, as well as on whether Pritchard’s 
disjunctivism is really able to solve a version of the sceptical paradox, not much attention 
has been devoted to the so-called Access Problem4. In this paper, I will focus on this more 
neglected argument, thus hoping to foster and expand the debate around this issue. After 
clarifying the nature of the problem (Section 1), and considering Pritchard’s response to 
this challenge, I point out that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a satisfying 
one, we first need to have a better idea of what it takes for someone to have ‘Reflective 
Access’ of one’s rational support R (Section 2). In particular, Pritchard has to provide an 
account of reflective knowledge that predicts (i) that one can have purely reflective 
knowledge of one’s empirical rational support (seeing that), and (ii) that one does not have 
purely reflective knowledge of what one’s rational support entails (P). This turns out to be 
a very difficult task. After considering three possible ways of cashing out the notion of 
Reflective Access, I show that none of them enables us to satisfyingly resist the Access 
Problem (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, I consider Tim Kraft’s paper (2015), in which he offers 
a different diagnosis of why Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem is unsatisfying. I 
argue that the source/content distinction he appeals to is unconvincing and leads to 
undesirable results (Section 5). This shows why my diagnosis should be preferred. I 
conclude that, as it stands, the Access Problem represents a real challenge for Pritchard’s 
view. More interestingly, I conclude that the arguments I have provided shed light on a 
general problematic feature of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism, namely, the lack 
of an unambiguous and unproblematic account of reflective knowledge (Section 6).  
 
                                                        
4 For a discussion on the basis problem see, for example, Pritchard (2011), Ranalli (2014) and 
Ghijsen (2014). For a discussion on the distinguishability problem see Dennis (2014) and Ranalli 
(2014). For a recent discussion on whether Pritchard’s Disjunctivism is able to resist the Sceptical 
Paradox see Ashton (2015), Zalabardo (2015).  
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1. Epistemological Disjunctivism and The Access Problem 
In his Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), Duncan Pritchard addresses the so-called Access 
Problem as representing a prima facie challenge for his view. Before describing the Access 
Problem in detail, it is worth mentioning that Pritchard takes this problem to mirror the 
more notorious McKinsey paradox allegedly showing the incompatibility between Content 
Externalism and Privileged Access. Take Privileged Access to be, roughly put, the thesis 
that one can know by reflection the content of one’s mental states5. Take Content 
Externalism to be, roughly put, the thesis that the content of one’s mental states is 
determined by factors in the external environment. Imagine now that one has a “water 
thought”, e.g., the thought that the water is wet. Privileged Access entails that one can 
know by reflection that one has a water thought. Content Externalism entails that if one 
has a water thought then one has interacted with H2O. Assuming one can know by 
reflection that Content Externalism is true, and assuming a closure principle for reflective 
knowledge, the McKinsey paradox aims to show that one can know by reflection a 
contingent fact about the environment, e.g., one can know by reflection that one has 
interacted with H2O, yet this is absurd
6, 7.  
 
                                                        
5 It is worth pointing out that Michael McKinsey does not talk about reflective knowledge: he talks 
about a priori knowledge of one’s mental content. However, the notion of a priori knowledge in 
McKinsey’s papers (and, more in general, in the post-McKinsey literature) is thought of as 
including introspection (contrary to what happens in the a priori/a posteriori debate, where introspective 
knowledge is generally considered to be empirical knowledge). For homogeneity reasons, I will 
here talk about reflective knowledge. 
6 See Putnam (1975), McKinsey (1991), and Boghossian (1997). For a collection of articles on the 
McKinsey problem for Content and Semantic Externalism see Nuccetelli (2003). 
7 Although most philosophers have taken this consequence to be plainly unacceptable, Sarah 
Sawyer resists the McKinsey paradox by biting the bullet: Content Externalism and Privileged 
Access Thesis jointly lead to the conclusion that we can know by reflection alone specific empirical 
propositions. However, she argues, this is not an unacceptable result. See Sawyer, (1998).   
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By requiring the rational support to be both factive and reflectively accessible, and 
assuming the plausible thesis that it is possible to know by reflection alone that seeing that 
p entails p, Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) seems to immediately face a problem 
analogous to the one faced by Content Externalism8. Pritchard’s formulation of this so-
called Access Problem goes as follows: 
 
The Access Problem9 
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical 
proposition p is the factive reason R. 
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. 
So, 
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. (Pritchard 
2012: 46)  
 
The first premise AP1 is a direct consequence of Pritchard’s ED. In particular, what 
matters for the foregoing argument to go through is the thesis, entailed by ED, that a 
subject S can know by reflection alone that R, where S’s rational support R is S’s seeing that. 
The second premise AP2 is a thesis about S’s knowledge of the truth-entailing nature of 
                                                        
8 Note that a similar problem might arise for other varieties of evidential externalism, e.g., for 
Williamson’s E=K (see Silins 2005, Littlejohn 2012). However, in Fratantonio (2018) I argue that 
the Access Problem does not represent a threat to E=K. See also Fratantonio & McGlynn 2018, 
p. 86-90. For a critical overview on the main arguments and motivations behind evidential 
Internalism-evidential externalism see Fratantonio forthcoming. 
9 In evaluating the McKinsey-style challenge for (ED), Pritchard considers four different 
formulations of the Access Problem. This first one is the main formulation he considers, the one 
around which Pritchard focuses his discussion on the Access Problem. As I it will be clear later, 
this formulation of the Access Problem argument is one that assumes that the agent is in a 
paradigmatically good case of perceptual knowledge. See Pritchard, 2012, p. 29-30. Following 
Pritchard, I will mainly focus on this formulation of the Access Problem. However, to understand 
better Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, I will briefly consider all formulations of the 
argument. 
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R. This second premise is usually taken to be plausible, for it merely assumes that S can 
know by reflection alone that seeing that p entails p. However, the conclusion, which is the 
result of S making a competent deduction, looks (allegedly) unacceptable. Before 
evaluating Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, let me highlight the crucial role 
that a Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge plays in the foregoing argument. I take 
the Closure Principle for Reflective ´Knowledge to be the following CRK: 
 
(CRK): If one knows by reflection alone that p, and one knows by reflection alone that 
p entails q, and one competently deduces q from p while retaining her knowledge that 
p, then one knows by reflection alone that q10, 11. 
 
The foregoing formulation of closure is what underpins the argument driving the Access 
Problem. That is, the argument’s validity crucially depends on the truth of CRK. We can 
thus briefly summarise the Access Problem as follows: given that it is possible to know by 
reflection alone that R AP1, and that it is possible to know by reflection alone that R entails 
p AP2) then, if CRK is true, it follows the disastrous conclusion that it is possible to know 
by reflection alone that p. If Pritchard wants to save ED he thus needs to block the 
argument from AP1 to APC. 
 
2.  Pritchard’s Response To Access Problem 
                                                        
10 This formulation of closure principle is built upon the one offered in Williamson (2000a) and 
Hawthorne (2005). 
11 Insofar as it’s plausible to assume that deductive reasoning is a way of coming to know something 
by reflection, the consequent of the conditional CRK might look redundant. However, for the sake 
of clarity I will use Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge as stated in CRK. 
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As described above, what distinguishes Epistemological Disjunctivism is the conjunction 
of the following two constraints: 
 
a. The possibility of having purely reflective access to one’s rational support R. 
b. The truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support R. 
 
These two constraints underpin AP1 and AP2 respectively. It is thus the 
conjunction of (a.) and (b.) that, together with CRK, gives rise to the Access Problem. 
Fortunately, Pritchard seems to have a solution to this problem. That is, he argues that: 
 
“the access problem does not represent a challenge to [epistemological 
disjunctivism], because the conclusion of the above argument […] fails to follow 
from the premises, contrary to first appearances” (Pritchard 2012: 47). 
 
Insofar as Pritchard is not willing to reject either (a.) or (b.), his line of response can be 
defined as compatibilist12. That is, he maintains that the accessibility thesis a. and factivity of 
one’s rational support b. are jointly compatible. Instead, given the argument from AP1 to 
APC, he rejects the conclusion APC: given the possibility of reflective knowledge of one’s 
rational support, and given factivity of one’s rational support (as entailed by ED), it does 
not follow that one can have reflective knowledge of the empirical proposition p, thereby 
leaving ED untouched. But what is Pritchard’s motivation for rejecting the entailment 
from AP1 and AP2 to APC? 
                                                        
12 The terminology is here borrowed from Jessica Brown who, in her discussion on the McKinsey 
paradox for Content Externalism, takes a compatibilist response to the McKinsey Paradox to be one 
claiming that Content Externalism and Privileged Access are jointly compatible. See Brown, 2004. 
  
 
8 
 
To see why, according to Pritchard, the conclusion APC does not follow from the 
premises, Pritchard invites us to unpack premise AP1 and to reformulate the Access 
Problem as follows: 
 
Access Problem’ 
(AP1)’ S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical 
proposition p is the factive reason that she sees that p. 
(AP2)’ S can know by reflection alone that if she sees that p, then p. 
So, 
(APC)’ S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p.13 
(2012: 47) 
 
According to Pritchard, once we specify that one’s rational support is the empirical reason 
that one sees that p, we can appreciate that, although one can have purely reflective 
knowledge of one’s rational support R, the conclusion APC’ doesn’t seem to follow, for it 
looks like S does not derive that p by reflection alone. 
 
Perhaps one can reformulate the argument in a way that resist Pritchard’s response here. 
In particular, one could appeal to a feature of Pritchard’s own view, namely, the fact that 
seeing that p is a way of knowing that p only in paradigmatically good cases. This means 
that, according to Pritchard, one can see that p without knowing or even believing that p 
(e.g., in cases in which one has a misleading defeater) (2012: 25-34). The proponent of the 
                                                        
13 Note that this formulation of the Access Problem is still assuming that S is in a paradigmatically 
good case. 
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Access Problem could thus reformulate the first premise of the argument, such that S has 
purely reflective access to her empirical rational support, but S does not believe that p: 
 
Access Problem’’ 
(AP1’’) S can know by reflection alone that she is in possession of the factive 
reason R for believing the specific empirical proposition p (although she does not 
believe that p on any empirical basis). 
(AP2’’) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. 
So, 
(APC’’) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. 
(Pritchard, 2012: 49) 
 
Reformulating the argument with AP1’’ is supposed to prevent Pritchard from claiming 
that, given S already knows empirically that p in AP1’’, the conclusion does not follow 
from the premises. After all, it is explicit in AP1’’ that S doesn’t even believe that p! 
Pritchard anticipates this objection but he does not think it represents a threat to ED. For 
note that, on his view, it is only in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge that one 
can have purely reflective access to one’s factive rational support. According to Pritchard, 
one’s seeing that p is not reflectively accessible in cases that are epistemologically sub-
optimal, such as cases in which one is in epistemically favourable circumstances but one 
fails to believe (and thus know) that p (e.g., because in possession of misleading defeaters) 
(2012: 51). If ED is true, the first premise AP1’’ is just plainly false. 
 
One might wonder why we should not grant some sort of reflective access in sub-optimal 
cases as well. However, I will not be concerned with this issue here. For the sake of the 
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paper, I will assume, with Pritchard, that we can have purely reflective knowledge of our 
rational support in paradigmatic cases of reflective knowledge only14.  Once we accept this 
restriction, it seems Pritchard can say that the conclusion of the Access Problem does not 
follow from the premises, and this is because 
 
“S’s route to her acquisition of this (putatively) exclusively reflective knowledge of 
the target proposition essentially depends on the fact that she has empirical reason to 
believe this proposition” (Pritchard, 2012: 47, italics added). 
 
This, in a nutshell, explains why S’s knowledge in APC fails to constitute a genuine instance 
of ‘exclusively reflective knowledge’. More precisely, what Pritchard is claiming in the 
foregoing quotation is that, in order for one’s instance of propositional knowledge to be 
in the market for ‘purely reflective knowledge’, it cannot be essentially dependent on one’s 
empirical reasons. But here’s the problem: it’s far from clear what it means for one’s 
knowledge (and for one’s propositional attitude more in general) to essentially depend on 
one’s empirical reasons, and, unfortunately, Pritchard does not explicitly spell out which 
notion of dependency is in play here. Crucially, in order to assess whether Pritchard’s 
response to the Access Problem is as effective as he hopes it to be, we need to have a 
better grasp of what it means to have purely reflective access. That is, we need an account 
of what it takes for an instance of knowledge to be essentially dependent on any empirical 
reasons one might have. More precisely, for Pritchard’s response to be successful, we need 
a notion of dependency that meets the following two desiderata: 
 
                                                        
14 In fact, as it will be clear later, none of my arguments against Pritchard’s response depends on 
this feature of ED. From now on, I will thus assume that S is in a paradigmatic good case. 
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(i) it predicts that one can have purely reflective knowledge of one’s empirical 
rational support (R); 
(ii) it predicts that one cannot have purely reflective knowledge of what the 
rational support entails (P). 
 
In what follows, I will consider three accounts of ‘essential dependency’, each of which 
underpins three different ways of understanding “purely reflective access”: a metaphysical 
understanding, a folk understanding (Section 3), and an epistemic understanding (Section 
4). While I will consider and develop all three possible readings, I will devote most of my 
attention to the epistemic understanding because, as I will point out later, I take this to be 
the most charitable interpretation of Pritchard’s words. However, I will argue that none of 
these interpretations is able to satisfyingly meet both the above-mentioned desiderata.  
 
Before analysing these different accounts of essential dependency, I want to make two 
important methodological remarks. First, as mentioned before, part of the aim of this 
paper is to offer different interpretations of what it means for S to have “purely reflective 
knowledge”. Therefore, I will take the notion of “purely reflective knowledge” to work as 
a placeholder standing for something that can be cashed out in different ways.15 Second, 
in this paper I am going to assume that, if purely reflective knowledge is indeed sometimes 
possible, then anything that is deduced from this original instance of reflective knowledge 
(and from premises that are known purely reflectively) will remain reflective knowledge. 
After all, as I have pointed out before, reflective knowledge is closed under competent 
deduction. This amounts to saying that deduction does not add any empirical element into 
                                                        
15 As it will be clear in the next section, some ways of spelling out this notion are less plausible than 
others. 
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one’s knowledge. This is highly uncontroversial. However, it means that for any of the 
interpretations of “purely reflective knowledge” I offer, “purely reflective knowledge” will 
be preserved by competent deductive inference. A straightforward and important 
consequence of assuming that deductive inference does not introduce any empirical 
element to one’s original reflective knowledge is that we cannot legitimately accommodate 
(i) and (ii) by appealing to two different interpretations of “purely reflective knowledge”. 
For the only way in which one can do so would be by saying that there is at least one 
interpretation of “purely reflective knowledge” such that deduction-based knowledge (and 
deductive inference in general) does not classify as purely reflective knowledge (or purely 
reflective inference) under that interpretation. 
 
3.  On the Metaphysical and Folk Interpretation of Essential Dependency 
As mentioned in the previous section, Pritchard’s way of dealing with the Access Problem 
argument is to reject its conclusion. Although we can have reflective knowledge of our 
rational support R (i.e., our seeing that), we do not have reflective knowledge of what R 
entails (i.e., p). This is because, Pritchard says, our knowledge of p essentially depends on our 
having empirical reason R in the first place, and reflective knowledge is knowledge that 
does not essentially depend on empirical reasons. But what does it mean for a doxastic 
attitude to essentially depend on empirical reasons? The first interpretation I consider here is 
what I call the metaphysical notion of dependency: 
 
(Metaphysical Dependency): S’s believing that p metaphysically depends on x for a 
subject S iff, S wouldn’t believe that p if x had not been the case. 
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Assume Metaphysical Dependency is the correct way of understanding the notion of 
‘essential dependency’. We can then say that S’s knowledge that p is reflective knowledge 
only if, S’s knowledge that p does not metaphysically depend on S’s empirical support, e.g., 
S’s seeing that. That is, S’s knowledge that p is reflective knowledge only if, it is not the case 
that: if S hadn’t had the “seeing” in the first place, S wouldn’t believe that p. 
 
Can we rely on this metaphysical understanding of the notion of dependency in order to 
satisfyingly resist the Access Problem? If S knows that p in virtue of seeing that p, then it’s 
plausible to say that S’s knowledge that p metaphysically depends (in the sense expressed by 
Metaphysical Dependency) on S’s empirical support. For remember that Pritchard is 
concerned with paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge16. Therefore, if S knows that 
p by seeing that p, then S wouldn’t have believed that p if S hadn’t seen that p. Thus, it 
looks like Metaphysical Dependency rightly predicts that one does not have reflective 
knowledge of the empirical proposition p. However, if Metaphysical Dependency is the 
notion of essential dependency that we should consider, then, how can we account for the 
fact that one has purely reflective knowledge of one’s rational support in paradigmatic 
good cases? If what Pritchard has in mind is a notion of “purely reflective knowledge” that 
should be understood in the light of this metaphysical interpretation of the notion of 
essential dependency, then it looks like we can’t allow for one to have reflective knowledge of 
one’s rational support either. In fact, one’s knowledge of one’s seeing that p clearly 
metaphysically depends (in the sense expressed in Metaphysical Dependency) on S’s 
                                                        
16 It is important to stress that Pritchard is concerned with paradigmatic cases of perceptual visual 
knowledge because one might be tempted to say that, if Metaphysical Dependency is the right 
interpretation of the notion of essential dependency in play, then S knows that p by reflection. 
After all, one might say, even if S hadn’t seen that p, one might come to know that p in a different 
way, such as, by testimony. Appealing to paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge stops this 
move.  
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empirical seeing in the first place. This first metaphysical interpretation of essential 
dependency is thus not a promising one, for it fails to meet one of the desiderata that a 
satisfying interpretation of essential dependency should have: although it successfully 
denies reflective knowledge of the empirical proposition one’s rational support entails, it 
fails to allow for reflective knowledge of one’s rational support. Furthermore, note that 
this would be a particularly disastrous conclusion for Pritchard. For remember that on his 
definition of Epistemological Disjunctivism, those paradigmatic cases of perceptual 
knowledge are cases of perceptual knowledge in virtue of the fact that one has reflectively 
accessible (factive) rational support. Embracing Epistemological Disjunctivism together 
with a metaphysical account of reflective access would thus entail the sceptical conclusion 
that paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge are not possible. We can thus safely say 
that this metaphysical interpretation of “essential dependency” surely cannot be the notion 
Pritchard has in mind when talking about “purely reflective knowledge”. 
 
Let’s now move onto the second interpretation of essential dependency, namely, what I 
call the folk interpretation. Remember, once again, that, on Pritchard’s view, one’s knowledge 
can be classified as purely reflective knowledge iff it does not essentially depend on one’s 
empirical reasons. However, a defender of Epistemological Disjunctivism might claim that 
we should weaken the foregoing notions of ‘essential dependency’ and “reflective access”. 
That is, one might argue that we should understand “reflective access” as referring to a 
very cheap and undemanding notion, one that is compatible with the layman’s everyday 
usage of “knowing something by reflection alone and without further empirical enquiry”17. 
The idea here is that, even if one had to see that p before coming to know that one sees that 
                                                        
17 Greco (2013) seems to have something like this in mind when talking about reflective knowledge. 
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p, one can acquire this knowledge merely by ‘reflecting’ on one’s situation and without 
having to carry any further empirical check. Contrary to the metaphysical interpretation of 
reflective knowledge, appealing to this folk interpretation allows for purely reflective 
knowledge of one’s rational support. At the same time, however, it entails that one can 
have purely reflective knowledge of the target empirical proposition entailed by one’s 
rational support. After all, one can just “reflect” on what seeing that p entails without 
having to conduct an empirical check. While this folk interpretation meets the first 
desideratum, it does not seem to accommodate the second one. This seems problematic 
for Pritchard, given that he takes one advantage of his view to be that it is a non-revisionary 
thesis, one that leaves our pre-theoretical intuitions untouched. Accepting the conclusion 
APC would thus fail to account for the general intuition that it is in fact absurd to have 
“reflective knowledge” of specific empirical propositions. 
 
Perhaps Pritchard could thus bite the bullet here, thereby granting the possibility of 
“reflective knowledge” of a specific empirical proposition p. At the same time, he could 
say that, once we are not taking “reflective knowledge” to be any technical notion, this 
would not be a disastrous conclusion after all. In fact, Pritchard could rightly point out 
that, given this weakened notion of essential dependency, accepting that one can have 
“purely reflective knowledge” that p does not even constitute a real biting the bullet 
strategy. For note that the Access Problem does not concern the possibility of 
extrapolating by reflection the consequences of what one already knows empirically, as 
there is nothing problematic about that. Rather, it concerns the possibility of having purely 
reflective knowledge of an empirical proposition. And yet, on this folk interpretation, one’s 
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“purely reflective knowledge” that p in APC would be “purely reflective knowledge” only 
in name.18 
 
Despite its prima facie plausibility, I am afraid this strategy is also problematic, for it clashes 
with Pritchard’s overall project of offering Epistemological Disjunctivism as the holy grail 
of epistemology, namely, as a view that combines the core commitments of both 
traditional internalism and externalism, thereby shedding light on a new logical possibility. 
First, note that if we say that, in APC, one has purely reflective knowledge that p in the 
“folk sense” (i.e., in the sense of having “knowledge without further empirical enquiry”), 
we will have to insist that one’s rational support in AP1 is also reflectively accessible in the 
same “folk sense”. Crucially, a weak interpretation of “reflective knowledge”, such as the 
one offered by the folk interpretation, would fail to capture the internalist conception of 
“access” that, by contrast, has been traditionally understood in relation to the technical 
notions of cognitive accessibility and doxastic responsibility. More precisely, what lies behind 
Pritchard’s accessibility requirement seems to be an internalist conception of rationality, 
one on which one’s rational support has to be unproblematically and immediately given to 
one19. Furthermore, embracing a more conservative account of “purely reflective 
knowledge” in AP1 (in a way that is in line with access internalism), while saying that we 
should read “purely reflective knowledge” in APC along this more liberal folk 
interpretation (in a way that makes the conclusion APC unproblematic) is also not an 
option available to the defender of Epistemological Disjunctivism. For, as I pointed out in 
                                                        
18 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue. 
19 To put it in Pritchard’s words: “[i]f rational support were not so accessible – if in particular it 
was opaque to one that one’s beliefs enjoyed this rational support – then it would be hard to see 
why it would count as rationally supporting your belief that p” (2012: 14). 
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the previous Section, we cannot accommodate desirata (i) and (ii) by appealing to two 
different notions of “purely reflective access”20. 
 
Finally, if the accessibility requirement underpinning Pritchard’s Epistemological 
Disjunctivism has to be understood along this folk interpretation, then the worry is that 
Pritchard fails to distinguish his view from more radical and traditional externalist theories 
of rational support21. That is, if all Epistemological Dijsunctivism entails is that, after seeing 
that p, we can know our rational support (seeing that) by reflecting on our epistemic 
situation and without conducing any further empirical inquiry, then this seems to be 
something that almost everyone would be willing to accept. After all, everyone – externalist 
included – would grant that in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge we can have knowledge 
of what our rational support is. For instance, Williamson, who notoriously rejects access 
internalism, would still acknowledge that in favourable cases we are in the position to know 
what our evidence is (Williamson, 2000: 15). Similarly, as John Greco has pointed out, if 
this is the conception of “purely reflective knowledge” Pritchard has in mind, then, even 
paradigmatic externalist theories, such as, reliabilism, would grant that in paradigmatic 
cases of perceptual knowledge we know “purely by reflection” that our (reliable) rational 
support is our seeing that something is the case (Greco, 2013: 120). 
 
                                                        
20 The way in which appealing to two conceptions of reflective knowledge would allegedly 
accommodate desiderata (i) and (ii) is that one could say that, although one has purely reflective 
knowledge in a strong sense in AP1 (thereby meeting (i)), one does not have purely reflective 
knowledge in this strong sense in APC (thereby meeting (ii)). For in APC one has reflective 
knowledge only in this weak “folk” sense. As I have stressed already, this is not a legitimate move. 
In fact, if we opted for a stricter version of “purely reflective knowledge” AP1 and for this weaker 
“folk” interpretation of purely reflective knowledge in APC, then we will have to blame deductive 
reasoning as that which is responsible for converting this strong reflective knowledge in AP1 into 
more “empirically contaminated” knowledge in APC. 
21 I take rational support here to indicate both the notions of evidence and epistemic justification. 
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4.  On the Epistemic Interpretation of Essential Dependency 
In the previous Section, I have considered two interpretations of the notion of essential 
dependency, namely, a metaphysical interpretation and a folk interpretation. I have shown 
that none of them is actually satisfying. The former is too restrictive and it predicts that 
one can have reflective knowledge of neither one’s rational support R nor what R entails. 
The latter seems too liberal, for it predicts that one can have reflective knowledge of both 
one’s rational support R as well as the empirical proposition P one’s rational support R 
entails. In the remainder of this paper, I will focus on what I call the epistemic interpretation 
of the notion of essential dependency. I take this to be the most charitable interpretation 
of Pritchard’s words. Crucially, I will argue that, despite being more promising than the 
metaphysical and folk interpretations, the epistemic interpretation is nonetheless highly 
problematic. I will thus conclude that, as things stand, there’s no plausible account of 
essential dependency (and thus of Reflective Access) that would enable the defender of 
Epistemological Disjunctivism to resist the Access Problem. 
 
I believe that Pritchard’s notion of dependency is to be understood in the light of what 
constitutes his main target of interest, namely, the nature of perceptual knowledge and, 
most of all, the nature of a (rational) epistemic basis, together with his interest in doxastic 
justification22. Bearing this in mind, I will here understand the notion of epistemic 
dependency as the following conditional: 
                                                        
22 His being concerned with what constitutes the epistemic basis for perceptual knowledge 
becomes clear in his text, especially in the following two passages: 
“[W]hat is key is that one is no longer basing one’s belief on the empirical epistemic 
support once the competent proof has been conducted. Indeed, it is only if this is so that 
the resultant knowledge is properly classed as exclusively reflective.” (Pritchard: 2012: 48) 
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(Epistemic Dependency) S’s believing that p epistemically depends on x for a subject S 
iff, S’s believing that p is based on x23, 24. 
 
If we take Epistemic Dependency to be the notion of dependency Pritchard has in mind, 
then the fact that S’s knowledge that p essentially depends on S’s having the empirical reason 
that she sees that p is to be understood as the fact that the (rational) reason why S is believing 
that p (and, granted that S is in a paradigmatic good case, S knows that p) is that she sees 
that p25. In other words, S’s knowledge that p epistemically depends on S’s seeing that p, 
insofar as S is basing her belief that p on the fact that she sees that p. We can recapitulate 
things as follows: Pritchard has to resist the argument from AP1 to APC in order to save 
his ED. Given he is committed to both premises AP1 and AP2, he rejects the conclusion 
APC. What is Pritchard’s motivation for rejecting APC? The answer seems to be that, 
while S’s knowledge that R is reflective, S’s knowledge that p is not reflective after all, 
rather it is an instance of empirical knowledge, given that S’s reason for believing that p is 
primarily S’s seeing that p. That is, S’s knowledge that p is mainly based on S’s seeing that p.  
 
                                                        
“[…] the challenge we are raising for the access problem explicitly concerns a case where 
the agent continues to base her belief on the prior empirical epistemic support that she has 
[i.e., the fact that she sees that p].” (Pritchard 2012: 48) 
 
23 I take the epistemic basis in Epistemic Dependency to be the notion of epistemic basis 
traditionally involved in the notion of doxastic justification. This is not an uncontroversial topic. 
However, an analysis of the notion of epistemic basis would be beyond the scope of this paper. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to cash out the notion of “epistemic basis” in terms 
of S’s reasons on the basis of which S believes a target proposition. 
24 Note that this is not related to what Pritchard has in mind when talking about “epistemic 
dependence” in his (2015). 
25 I am here assuming that S’s belief that p is based on r iff r is S’s reason for believing that p. Note 
that this biconditional is not uncontroversial. In particular one could question the right to left side 
of the biconditional. However, this won’t matter for the purpose of the paper. 
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4.1  Why the Epistemic Interpretation is Problematic 
In the previous section, I reconstructed Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem in the 
light of an epistemic interpretation of the notion of dependency involved. Prima facie, it 
looks like this epistemic interpretation is able to meet the above-mentioned two desiderata. 
Crucially, at closer inspection, we can see that, even in the light of this more promising 
notion of ‘essential dependency’, Pritchard’s response is problematic. In particular, I now 
argue that relying on this epistemic interpretation enables Pritchard to successfully resist 
the Access Problem only at the high cost of rejecting a plausible Closure Principle for 
Reflective Knowledge. Let’s see why. 
 
As I have mentioned in section 2.1 of this paper, Pritchard’s response to the Access 
Problem can be thought of as a compatibilist one, insofar as he argues that factivity of 
rational support and privileged access are jointly compatible (as follows from ED). If 
Pritchard wants to save ED, he needs to block the argument from AP1 and AP2 to APC. 
He cannot reject AP1 without giving up his view, for, as mentioned above, AP1 directly 
follows from ED. He cannot reject AP2 without embracing very counterintuitive ideas, 
for, as mentioned above, AP2 is overwhelmingly plausible. Rejecting the conclusion APC, 
thereby questioning the argument’s validity, seems thus to be the only way to go. As we 
have seen, the way Pritchard argues for the rejection of APC is by pointing out that S’s 
knowledge that p essentially depends on S’s having factive reason R (i.e., on S’s seeing that p). 
On Pritchard’s view, even if we grant the possibility of reflective knowledge of R and 
reflective knowledge of the truth-entailing nature of R, the allegedly disastrous conclusion 
APC does not follow, for S already knows the specific empirical proposition p on the basis 
of her factive rational support R. The most S can come to know by reflection alone is 
something about her rational support, and not the specific empirical proposition p 
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(Pritchard, 2012: 51). As Pritchard maintains when reformulating the Access Problem, 
what follows from AP1 and AP2 is, at best, the following modified conclusion (MAPC): 
 
(MAPC) “[…] S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the 
specific empirical proposition p is the factive empirical reason R that entails P” 
(Pritchard 2012: 51).  
 
But, is MAPC really the strongest claim you can get from AP1, AP2 and CRK, as presented 
in the Access Problem? I here argue that it is not. 
 
In order to see clearly what is in play in Pritchard’s response, and why MAPC is not the 
strongest claim we can get from AP1 and AP2, let us reformulate Pritchard’s modified 
argument, namely, one which has AP1 and AP2 as its premises, and MAPC as its 
conclusion. Let RKs be “S knows by reflection alone that”; let rs be “S has factive rational 
support R” and let p be an empirical proposition: 
 
(AP1*) RKs [rs]  
(AP2*) RKs [rs  p] 
(MAPC) RKs [rs&(rs  p)] 
 
The above formulation of the argument shows that the conclusion MAPC results from 
the conjunction of one’s reflective knowledge of one’s having rational support R (AP1) 
with one’s knowledge of the truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support R (AP2). What 
Pritchard needs to assume in order to derive the conclusion MAPC from the premises is 
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nothing as strong as a closure principle CRK, but rather a mere Principle of 
Agglomeration26. Crucially, if this is correct, Pritchard’s reformulated version of the 
argument fails to capture the real worry addressed by the original Access Problem27. The 
original Access Problem, as Pritchard himself presents it, is one which involves the 
possibility of knowing by reflection alone the conceptual implications that follow from 
one’s previous reflective knowledge, assumed that reflective knowledge is closed under 
known entailment. If Pritchard wants to save his ED from the Access Problem, he should 
thus consider the original formulation of the Access Problem in the first place, one which 
rests on the above-mentioned closure principle CRK (and not one involving the Principle 
of Agglomeration). Crucially, once the Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge is back 
on the table, it is easy to see that MAPC is no longer the strongest claim we can get from 
the premises AP1 and AP2. In fact, if we reformulate the argument involving a Closure 
Principle for Reflective Knowledge (CRK), we can derive the stronger conclusion APC, 
i.e., that it is possible to have reflective knowledge of a specific empirical proposition p: 
 
(AP1*) KRs [rs] 
(AP2*) KRs [rs  p] 
(APC*) KRs [p]
28 
                                                        
26 I take a general Principle of Agglomeration for reflective knowledge to be the following 
conditional: (KRs[p] & KRs [q]) ⊃ KRs [p&q]. 
27 In fact, it would also fail to capture McKinsey’s original worry. When describing the paradox, 
what McKinsey has in mind is a conceptual notion of dependency, and the problem is one involving 
a closure principle for knowledge. He writes:  
 
“[I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that 
state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could 
know a priori that the external world exists” (McKinsey, 1991: 16).  
 
28 It is worth noting that a single premise closure is actually enough to take us from (MAPC) to the 
undesirable consequence (APC*). 
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Remember that what Pritchard needs is an account of ‘essential dependency’ (and thus 
of ‘reflective knowledge’) that meets the following two desiderata: 
 
(i) it predicts that one has purely reflective knowledge of one’s rational support 
(seeing that). 
(ii) it predicts that one does not have purely reflective knowledge of what the 
rational support entails (P). 
 
What I have argued in this section is that, although the epistemic interpretation of the 
notion of essential dependency seems more promising than the metaphysical and the folk 
interpretation, merely appealing to this epistemic notion of essential dependency doesn’t 
enable us to satisfyingly meet the above-mentioned desiderata. Although understanding 
reflective knowledge in terms of Epistemic Dependency allows us to account for purely 
reflective knowledge of one’s rational support, it is not able explain why one cannot gain 
purely reflective knowledge of what the rational support entails. If the notion of reflective 
access underpinning Epistemological Disjunctivism is to be cashed out in terms of 
‘epistemic dependency’ then, Pritchard cannot resist the conclusion of the Access 
Problem, unless he is willing to reject a plausible Closure Principle for Reflective 
Knowledge. As I have shown, by questioning the argument’s validity, Pritchard has to 
account for the fact that the argument is valid iff the Closure Principle for Reflective 
Knowledge is true. To sum up: with an epistemic notion of essential dependency in place, 
the only way to resist the Access Problem seems thus to reject the plausible Closure 
Principle for Reflective Knowledge. 
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4.2   Restricting Closure 
Defenders of Pritchard’s version of ED could reply by biting the bullet: they could be 
willing to reject both APC as well as CRK. Crucially, this does not seem to be what 
Pritchard has in mind. If Pritchard were really committed to rejection of closure principle, 
then it is not clear why he never explicitly blames closure as being what generates this prima 
facie McKinsey-style problem29. As things stand, it seems Pritchard’s disjunctivism is in 
trouble. Perhaps, however, we can think of a possible solution. 
 
One possible strategy could be to argue for the following restricted version of closure 
(CRK’): 
 
(CRK’) If one knows by reflection alone that p, and one competently deduces q 
from p while retaining one’s knowledge by reflection that p, thereby coming to 
believe that q for the first time (on a reflective basis, or on any other basis), then 
one knows by reflection alone that q30. 
 
Pritchard could argue that the only closure principle we should consider seriously is the 
restricted CRK’. The advantage of arguing for CRK’ is straightforward: by rejecting CRK 
while appealing to CRK’ Pritchard could provide an explanation of why APC fails to follow 
                                                        
29 In his [2012: 51] Pritchard writes: “[T]he reasoning at issue in the access problem is revealed to 
be fallacious, in that for the premises to be true it simply cannot be the case that S’s knowledge of 
the target proposition is exclusively reflective”. One might read this passage as showing Pritchard’s 
commitment to rejecting closure, yet he never explicitly commits himself to such a rejection. On 
the contrary, although Pritchard never mentions a Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge in 
his discussion of the access problem, he does explicitly consider a very similar variety of closure 
principle for knowledge in other sections of his book. (see Pritchard 2012, p. 68). 
30 Remember that I am still assuming a notion of reflective knowledge as understood in Section 4, 
namely, as knowledge that does not epistemically depend on empirical reasons. 
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from the premises, while anyway retaining a version of closure. By posing an extra 
condition (i.e., one deductively comes to believe that q for the first time), the weaker CRK’ 
is entailed by CRK, thereby allowing Pritchard to reject the latter without rejecting the 
former version of closure. Crucially, while CRK is needed in order for the Access Problem 
argument to go through, CRK’ does not give rise to the same problem. Given that one 
knows by reflection alone that one has R, and that R entails p, it is easy for one to bring 
about a competent deduction, thereby coming to know by reflection that p. However, this 
piece of deductive knowledge is merely a second way in which one knows that p. That is, 
one does not know that p on a reflective basis for the first time, for one first comes to know 
that p empirically by means of seeing that p. It follows that from AP1, AP2 and a weaker 
closure CRK’, the conclusion APC does not follow. To recapitulate: Pritchard resists the 
Access Problem argument by rejecting its conclusion, namely, by questioning its validity. 
Since, as I have pointed out above, the validity of the argument driving the Access Problem 
depends on the acceptance of CRK, Pritchard is also forced to reject CRK. At the same 
time, there is another Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge, namely CRK’, that 
Pritchard can easily embrace without being forced to accept the Access Problem as a real 
challenge for ED. 
 
Crucially, there are at least two problems with this restricted closure principle. First, it is 
far from obvious why we should embrace this restricted version of closure principle and 
reject the unrestricted one. In order to see why I take CRK’ to be left unmotivated, let us 
imagine a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge. Let us suppose that S sees that q, 
thereby coming to know that q at time t1. Let us now suppose that, at a later time t2, S 
also gets testimony knowledge that p, and that p entails q. It seems intuitive to say that, 
given a plausible Closure Principle for Testimonial Knowledge, S also knows that q by 
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testimony. Let us now consider the following restricted version of Closure Principle for 
Testimonial Knowledge: 
 
(CTK’) If one knows by testimony that p, and one knows by testimony that p 
entails q, and one competently deduces q from p while retaining her knowledge 
that p, thereby coming to believe that q for the first time (on a testimony basis, or 
on any other basis), then one knows by testimony that q. 
 
If we were to embrace CTK’ (while rejecting an unrestricted Closure Principle for 
Testimonial Knowledge), nothing will guarantee that the conclusion that [S has testimonial 
knowledge that q at time t2] is true, insofar as S does not come to have testimonial 
knowledge that q for the first time (in fact, she already knew that q at t1). This, however, seems 
counterintuitive, for it is plausible to say that S can know that q both perceptually and, at 
a later time, by testimony. We probably wouldn’t be willing to reject an unrestricted 
Closure Principle for Testimonial Knowledge in favour of the restricted (CTK’): (CTK’) 
without (CTK) does not look appealing. But then, why should we reject unrestricted 
Closure for Reflective Knowledge, while embracing unrestricted Closure for Testimonial 
Knowledge? The point I want to make is that, we should expect any defender of a restricted 
closure principle, such as CRK’, to have a general strong motivation for favouring 
restricted closure principles over unrestricted ones. Crucially, it is not clear what reasons 
could be behind restricted closure principle. Besides avoiding the foregoing problem, what 
motivations underpin CRK’ is left unclear, thereby making this restriction looking like an 
ad hoc move. 
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Second, CRK’ is not applicable to cases in which one knows the target proposition in two 
ways31. Consider the following scenario. John is a first-year student in math. One day John 
goes to the lecture and his professor, Jane, mentions that there are infinitely many prime 
numbers. John thus comes to know this proposition by testimony. Suppose that some later 
time, John is actually able to prove that there are infinitely many prime numbers. He 
reasons and he deductively proves that proposition. Thus, John now knows the same 
proposition by reflection and deductive reasoning. Crucially, although John’s knowledge 
is the result of deductive reasoning, he does not come to know that proposition for the first 
time, as required by CRK’. It follows that, if CRK’ is the relevant variety of closure principle 
(and not CRK), then nothing will guarantee that John comes to know by reflection that 
there are infinitely many prime numbers. But this is highly counterintuitive32. Rejecting 
CRK, yet holding CRK’, does not guarantee that one can know something in more than 
one way. Once again, this restricted closure together with the negation of unrestricted 
closure principle does not look appealing. 
 
One might rightly point out that there is a crucial asymmetry between the scenario 
involving John and Jane, and the original scenario involved in the formulation of the 
Access Problem. While in the John and Jane scenario we have a combination of testimony 
and reflective knowledge, in the original scenario we have a combination of perceptual and 
reflective knowledge. It can then be argued that the way in which reflective knowledge 
depends on experience in the first scenario is not the same way in which reflective 
                                                        
31 In fact, this second point is enough to show the implausibility of restricted closure principle even 
to those who might want to reject my first point by stressing that it’s not clear whether testimony 
knowledge is closed under competent deduction.  
32 Note that we can get the same result when considering any disjunction of a contingent truth with 
a logical truth, e.g., the proposition that [the sun is shining v (pv¬p)]. 
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knowledge depends on testimony knowledge in the John and Jane scenario. In fact, while 
in the Access Problem S could have not had reflective knowledge that p without having 
had experience that p in the first place, the same is not true in the second scenario: John 
could have had gained reflective knowledge that there are infinitely many prime numbers 
even without having had testimony knowledge of that proposition. Nevertheless, what my 
argument aims to show is merely that although CRK’, as it stands, is true, it is nevertheless 
limited in its application and we should thus also embrace CRK. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that Pritchard is well aware of this problem and he explicitly 
denies the idea that one can never have reflective knowledge of a proposition if one already 
had empirical knowledge of the proposition. He says:  
 
“Note that the worry being raised here is not that one cannot come to have 
exclusively reflective knowledge of a proposition in cases where one already has 
an empirical basis for believing that proposition, since this is clearly 
false.”  (Pritchard, 2012: 48) 
 
In fact, he claims that the challenge posed by the Access Problem is more specific than 
that. After considering a case similar to the one I presented here, a case in which a student 
learns something first empirically, and then by means of a proof, he says: 
 
“Accordingly, it had better not be the case that the difficulty we are raising for the 
access problem trades on the idea that one cannot come to have exclusively 
reflective knowledge of a proposition in cases where one already has an empirical 
basis for believing that proposition. Fortunately for us, it doesn’t. For notice that 
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the challenge we are posing for the access problem is in fact far more specific. In 
the case just described where one moves from having empirical epistemic support 
to having (overwhelming) reflective epistemic support, and where one comes to 
know on this latter basis alone, what is key is that one is no longer basing one’s 
belief on the empirical epistemic support once the competent proof has been 
conducted. Indeed, it is only if this is so that the resultant knowledge is properly 
classed as exclusively reflective.” (Pritchard 2012: 48) 
 
Pritchard’s point thus seems to be that when S comes to know that p in the conclusion of 
the Access Problem, S is still basing her belief on her empirical epistemic support once the 
deductive reasoning has been conducted. That’s why S’s belief that p in the conclusion 
cannot be classified as reflective knowledge. Crucially, it’s really not clear why he would 
allow for reflective knowledge in the case of the student, but not in the case described by 
the Access Problem. What prevents the subject of our Access Problem from believing that 
p on a mere reflective basis, once he came to know that p empirically? In a nutshell, 
Pritchard owes an explanation as to why the subject S in the Access Problem Argument 
cannot believe that p while no longer basing her belief that p on her empirical support R. 
 
Before moving on to the next section, I want to make a final remark. The considerations 
I have drawn so far, and the arguments I have provided, show that if Pritchard wants to 
save his Epistemological Disjunctivism he has some work to do. But what I have said so 
far also enables us to make a step forward towards understanding the source of 
dissatisfaction with Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem. That is, the main reason 
why Pritchard’s response is not a satisfying one derives from the fact that the notion of 
reflective access underpinning ED is unclear. In this paper, I have tried to fill in this gap 
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by providing three ways of interpreting the notion of reflective access. Crucially, I have 
shown that none of them comes without serious problems. Before concluding the paper, 
I will consider an alternative diagnosis of Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, one 
recently put forward by Tim Kraft (2015). I will argue that my diagnosis of what’s 
problematic with Pritchard’s response is to be preferred.  
 
5.      An Alternative Diagnosis: Tim Kraft’s Source/Content Distinction. 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this paper, not much attention has been devoted to 
the Access Problem for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. In this final section, I 
consider one of the few papers explicitly addressing this problem, namely, Tim Kraft’s 
recent paper (2015), which provides an alternative diagnosis of where Pritchard’s response 
to the Access Problem goes wrong. I argue that the source/content distinction 
underpinning his diagnosis leads to undesirable results. 
 
Kraft’s starting point in critically evaluating Pritchard’s response is the same as mine. He 
quotes the relevant passage where Pritchard explicitly states that, contrary to first 
appearances, the conclusion of the argument fails to follow from the premises (Kraft 
quoting Pritchard, 2015: 318). He then acknowledges that, by rejecting the entailment from 
the premises to the conclusion, Pritchard is rejecting a plausible Closure Principle for 
Reflective Knowledge. In fact, he takes rejection of closure to be the only palatable option 
available to the disjunctivist. He writes: 
  
“[t]his leaves epistemological disjunctivism with only one option as a serious 
contender: the culprit must be closure of reflective knowledge. […] [T]his is the 
option chosen by Pritchard.” (Kraft, 2015: 317) 
  
 
31 
  
However, Kraft points out that Pritchard does not provide an explanation as to why 
closure for reflective knowledge fails in the Access Problem argument. In his paper, Kraft 
attempts to fill in this gap. He argues that an explanation can be given by appealing to a 
distinction between the source and the content of the empirical support. Roughly put, the 
idea is that there are two ways in which our epistemic support can be empirical: 
  
“According to the source criterion, R is empirical support for believing that P iff 
the source of one’s knowledge of, or of one’s access to, R is empirical. […] 
According to the content criterion, R is empirical support for believing that P iff 
the content of R has the form “I ϕ that p”, with “ϕ”, being a perceptual or 
experiential verb” (Kraft, 2015: 319). 
  
The advantage of appealing to the source/content distinction is, according to Kraft, 
twofold. First, the source/content distinction constitutes the conceptual tool the 
disjunctivist needs in order to account for the possibility of having reflective knowledge of 
an empirical support. Second, and more importantly, the source/content distinction would 
offer an explanation of why reflective knowledge fails to be closed under competent 
deduction. In order to see how it can do so, let us recall the original Access Problem 
argument: 
  
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that R. 
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. 
So, 
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. 
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With respect to the first point, Kraft claims that, once the source/content distinction is 
available, we can classify S’s knowledge that R in the premise AP1 as reflective knowledge 
because, despite the fact that R is empirical in the content sense, R is nonetheless reflective 
in the source sense. Hence, what Kraft seems to be suggesting is that the nature of the 
belief’s source is what determines whether the target instance of knowledge should be 
classified as reflective rather than empirical. 
 
But how the source/content distinction is supposed to explain why reflective knowledge 
is not closed under competent deduction? Here’s what Kraft says with respect to this 
second point: 
 
“If one deduces something from something known reflectively, one always ends up 
with more knowledge, but not necessarily with more reflective knowledge. Reflective access 
is lost if the first belief is reflective in the source sense but not in the content sense.” (Kraft, 2015: 319, 
italics are mine) 
  
As I have just explained, Kraft takes S’s knowledge in AP1 to be reflective because R in 
AP1 is reflective in the source sense, despite being empirical in the content sense. Kraft does 
not explicitly say anything about S’s knowledge in AP2, but in the light of what we have 
just said, we can plausibly assume he would classify it as an instance of reflective knowledge 
as well. In fact, the rational support R in AP2 is empirical in the content sense, but reflective 
in the source sense. Finally – and here is the crucial bit -, Kraft takes S’s knowledge in APC 
to be empirical knowledge because, as he says, “reflective access is lost if the first belief is 
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reflective in the source sense but not in the content sense”. Why is this so? Here’s Kraft’s 
motivation behind this: 
  
“[w]henever I see that P and believe that P (on that basis), my belief that P is 
empirical in the source sense – no matter how I can know that I see that P” (Kraft, 
2015: 319, italics added). 
  
Remember that the source of our knowledge that R is what defines whether this target 
knowledge is empirical or reflective. To say that “my belief that P is empirical in the source 
sense” is thus to say, in Kraft’s jargon, that my belief (and hence my knowledge) that P is 
an instance of empirical knowledge. This is supposed to explain why APC fails to follow 
from AP1 and AP2. Nevertheless, in the second half of his paper, Kraft argues that the 
Access Problem for Pritchard’s disjunctivism cannot be solved anyway. This is because – 
Kraft says – the source/content distinction can be employed only if a so-called 
“independent requirement” is met, but, as it turns out, Pritchard’s disjunctivism does not 
meet such a requirement. Here I shall not discuss whether Pritchard’s disjunctivism does 
or does not meet this “independent requirement”. What I will focus on is the plausibility 
of Kraft’s source/content distinction in the first place. In particular, in what follows, I 
make four brief remarks showing that Kraft’s source/content distinction is highly 
controversial, and that the way this distinction is exploited fails to capture the real reason 
why the Access Problem originally arises for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. 
  
To begin with, note that, while Kraft takes the rejection of closure for reflective knowledge 
to be the option chosen by Pritchard, this is far from being the case. In fact, as I have 
stressed in the previous sections, Pritchard never mentions denial of closure as the key to 
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solving the Access Problem. Now, Kraft takes rejection of closure as the only plausible 
option available to the disjunctivist. Whether this is true or not, it certainly is not something 
that we should light-heartedly welcome. Surely, it is something Pritchard should not 
happily welcome. Instead, as I’ve shown in the first half of this paper, it is the undesirable 
consequence Pritchard has to pay if he wants to resist the Access Problem for his 
Epistemological Disjunctivism. 
 
Second, and more importantly, Kraft’s source/content distinction, and the way he exploits 
it in order to explain why APC fails to follow from AP1, is unconvincing. On one hand, 
Kraft seems to take the source criterion to be what determines the nature of one’s 
knowledge. In fact, remember that it is exactly by appealing to S’s knowledge being 
reflective in the source sense that Kraft explains out the possibility of having reflective 
knowledge in AP1. On the other hand, remember that Kraft takes S’s knowledge that p in 
APC to be not reflective, because S’s belief in APC is deduced from her belief that R in 
AP1, which, despite being reflective in the source sense, is empirical in the content sense. 
As Kraft puts it: “Reflective access is lost if the first belief is reflective in the source sense 
but not in the content sense”. However, there is no reason why the content of S’s knowledge 
in AP1 should have a role in determining the nature of S’s belief in APC, namely, of the 
belief S infers from S’s original instance of knowledge in AP1, together with S’s reflective 
knowledge in AP2. That is, there is no reason why the content of S’s belief in AP1 should 
have a role in determining the source of S’s belief in APC. Furthermore, it seems arbitrary 
to state, as Kraft seems to be doing, that the content of S’s belief in AP1 is what determines 
the source of S’s belief in APC, while leaving the source of the belief in AP1 untouched. I 
take this to be a very puzzling aspect of the way Kraft cashes out the source/content 
distinction. 
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Third, and related, if we follow Kraft’s suggestion to reject closure, while motivating 
closure failure by appealing to his source/content distinction, we have a very controversial 
scenario in which one starts off with reflective knowledge (as in AP1), and ends up with 
empirical knowledge (as in APC), without doing anything but bringing about a competent 
deduction. I believe this upshot is even more absurd than the one predicted by the original 
Access Problem. 
 
Fourth, the source/content distinction, as Kraft uses it, has the undesirable result of 
classifying paradigmatic instances of reflective knowledge as cases of empirical knowledge. 
We have seen that, according to Kraft, one can have reflective knowledge of R, insofar as 
one’s knowledge is reflective in the source sense. However, if one’s knowledge of R is 
empirical in the content sense, then any other knowledge one has after the first belief will 
lose its reflective status. Or at least, this is what Kraft maintains. Let’s assume for a moment 
that he’s right in saying that S’s knowledge that R in AP1 can be classified as reflective, while 
S’s knowledge that P in APC should be classified as empirical. From S’s knowledge that P 
(in APC), S can easily infer, and thereby know, that (P v ¬P). Crucially, if Kraft’s diagnosis 
is correct, then we are forced to classify S’s knowledge that (P v ¬P) as empirical. But this 
is false: everyone would agree in taking S’s knowledge that (P v ¬P) to be non-empirical. 
However, here Kraft might have an explanation accounting for the puzzling phenomenon 
I have just described, namely the fact that: 
  
“[w]henever I see that P and believe that P (on that basis), my belief that P [in APC] 
is empirical in the source sense – no matter how I can know that I see that P” 
(Kraft, 2015: 319, italics added). 
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If this were so, perhaps we should just accept this way of exploiting the source/content 
distinction – pace our pre-theoretical intuitions33. Note, however, that the way he sets up 
the problem is mistaken in the first place. Kraft is assuming that S’s believe that P in the 
conclusion APC is based on S’s seeing that P. Crucially, this is exactly what is under 
discussion in the Access Problem. As I mentioned in the previous sections, the original 
problem is one in which S comes to know, by deductive reasoning alone, the conceptual 
implications of S’s previous reflective knowledge. For the same reason, to say that it does 
not matter how I can know that I see that P (Kraft, 2015: 319), is to simply dismiss the 
Access Problem as it originally arises for Pritchard’s view. Once we take seriously the 
challenge posed by the Access Problem, we are then back to consider a case in which S 
comes to believe and know that P in APC by deductive reasoning. 
 
In the light of the above considerations, I take my diagnosis of where Pritchard’s argument 
goes wrong to be preferred over Kraft’s one. Besides avoiding the unacceptable results 
that Kraft’s source/content distinction faces, my diagnosis better captures what is at the 
bottom of the Access Problem. That is, the diagnosis I’ve offered better highlights that 
what generates the Access Problem can eventually be traced back to a weakness of 
Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism: a lack of a clear and plausible account of what 
he calls “reflective access”. Furthermore, while Kraft’s diagnosis appeals to a controversial 
distinction, one that Pritchard does not explicitly embrace, the diagnosis I have provided 
                                                        
33 In fact, I suspect that Kraft might just bite the bullet here, given that Kraft himself explicitly 
considers the possibility of empirical knowledge of a priori truths in a different paper (Kraft, 2013). 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
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relies on (and only on) claims that can be derived from Pritchard’s own version of 
Epistemological Disjunctivism. 
  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have addressed the Access Problem for Pritchard’s Epistemological 
Disjunctivism (ED). The Access Problem, which mirrors the more notorious McKinsey-
paradox, aims to show that the conjunction of accessibilism and factivity of rational 
support (as entailed by ED) leads to the unacceptable conclusion that one can have 
reflective knowledge of a specific empirical proposition. In his book, Pritchard offers a 
way of resisting the problem, namely, he argues that the conclusion fails to follow from 
the premises: S does not know the specific empirical proposition p by reflection. Pritchard 
points out that one’s instance of knowledge can be classified as ‘reflective’ only if it does 
not essentially depend on any empirical reasons. Crucially, he does not provide us with a 
detailed account of what it takes for a doxastic attitude to essentially depend on empirical 
reasons. In this paper, I have argued that in order to assess the plausibility of Pritchard’s 
response to the Access Problem, we first need to clarify what it takes for someone to have 
Reflective Access in the first place. In particular, a satisfying account of Reflective Access 
(and the related notion of essential dependency) has to meet the following desiderata: (i) it 
has to allow for purely reflective access of one’s rational support; (ii) it has to deny purely 
reflective access to the empirical reason one’s rational support entails. I have thus provided 
three interpretations of the notion of essential dependency underlying Reflective Access: a 
metaphysical, a folk, and an epistemic interpretation. I have shown that none of the 
account is a satisfying one. The metaphysical account fails to meet the first desideratum. 
The folk interpretation fails to satisfyingly meet the second desideratum. Most of my 
attention has however been devoted to the epistemic interpretation insofar as I take this 
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to be the most charitable interpretation of Pritchard’s own words. Crucially, I have argued 
that the only way in which appealing to the epistemic interpretation enables us to resist the 
Access Problem, thereby meeting both the desiderata, comes at the high cost of rejecting 
a plausible Closure principle for Reflective Knowledge. Finally, I have considered an 
alternative attempt to make sense of Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, namely, 
the one offered by Kraft (2015). I have argued that the source/content distinction he 
appeals to is unconvincing and leads to undesirable consequences. As things stand, and 
without a clear and unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem 
remains a challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. 
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